[Vol. 153: 1347 ter ("WTC" or "towers") and the towers collapsing. 4 Additionally, driven by the broader purpose of the ATSSSA-protecting the airlines involved in the 9/11 attacks- 5 Congress capped the liability of the airlines at the limits of their insurance coverage. 6 This cap limited the airlines' liability to approximately six billion dollars, a pool from which all parties not eligible for the Fund must seek compensation. 7 In contrast, the legislation placed no cap on the amount eligible claimants could recover from the Fund. 8 In combination, the restrictive definition of eligible individuals and the airlines' limited liability created a class of victims, those injured by the 9/11 attacks but ineligible for the Fund, whose recovery-if any-will be limited to the airlines' insurance coverage. 9 This class notably includes the estimated 300,000 people exposed to the toxic plume released into lower Manhattan after the collapse of the World Trade Center towers, 10 as well as the rescue and recovery workers who arrived at the site more than ninety-six hours after the attacks. 11 This Comment asserts that Congress had no authority to cap the liability of the airlines with respect to those victims ineligible for the Fund. It discusses the grounds on which the limited liability provision of the legislation should be held unconstitutional and proposes that an alternative compensation scheme to anticipate and resolve the claims of exposure-only injury victims should be created.
I. THE PROBLEM A. The Purpose of the Victim Compensation Fund
The Fund is the largest single-incident social welfare program in the history of the United States.
12 Viewed in the light most generous to Congress, it was the product of a compelling desire to assist those most deeply and immediately impacted by the tragedy of 9/11. 13 Congress passed the ATSSSA only hours after it was drafted, 14 producing minimal legislative history to indicate its intent. 15 However, the few references to the Fund in the debate over the ATSSSA made congressional intent clear:
To ensure that the victims and families of victims who were physically injured or killed on September 11th are compensated even if courts determine that the airlines and any other potential corporate defendants are not liable for the harm; if insurance monies are exhausted; or are consumed by massive punitive damage awards or attorneys' fees, the bill also creates a victims' compensation fund. These victims and their families may, but are not required to, seek compensation from the Federal fund instead of through the litigation system.
-Sen. John McCain
16
The heart of every American aches for those who died or have been injured because of the tragic terrorist attacks in New York, Virginia, and (2004) (limiting "immediate aftermath" to within 96 hours after the crashes for rescue workers, and to within 12 hours after the crashes for all other claimants).
12 See Lisa Belkin, Just Money, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 92 (noting that the U.S. government has never made such payments to victims of attacks, natural disasters, or epidemics). 13 Although the overall legislation was to protect the airlines, the Fund was unquestionably a generous social welfare package intended to alleviate the suffering of those most personally harmed on 9/11. 14 also point to the purpose of the Fund:
The Fund provides an alternative to the significant risk, expense, and delay inherent in civil litigation by offering victims and their families an opportunity to receive swift, inexpensive, and predictable resolution of claims. The Fund provides an unprecedented level of federal financial assistance for surviving victims and the families of deceased victims.
22
Despite the admirable purpose expressed by those associated with the Fund, the eligibility requirements of the Fund were insurmountable for many. The Special Master's definition of eligibility, 23 although a practical response to the challenge presented to him, gave rise to the problem of precluded recovery for those victims not meeting his strict definition.
B. Defining Eligibility
Title IV defines eligible claimants as those individuals who were present at the World Trade Center, Pentagon, or crash site at Shanks-ville, Pennsylvania "at the time, or in the immediate aftermath, of the terrorist-related aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001; and suffered physical harm or death as a result of such an air crash."
24
This language raises the question: who suffered "physical harm" in "the immediate aftermath" of 9/11? C. Defining Physical Harm
Physical Harm Compensable by the Fund
The Final Rule defines the physical harm necessary to be eligible for the Fund as:
[A] physical injury to the body that was treated by a medical professional within 24 hours of the injury having been sustained, or within 24 hours of rescue, or within 72 hours of injury or rescue for those victims who were unable to realize immediately the extent of their injuries or for whom treatment by a medical professional was not available on September 11 . . . .
25
Although Title IV grants the Special Master the power to define harm as necessary to the adjudication of the Fund, 26 the Fund's definition of harm is different from the definition of physical harm developed by modern tort law. Despite recognition of exposure-only injuries as a class of injury in recent mass toxic tort decisions, 27 the Final Rule specifically excludes exposure-only injuries from eligibility.
28
These are victims who were exposed to carcinogens and toxins released into the air when the WTC towers collapsed and who may not manifest symptoms of disease for many years. The Special Master presented an administrative justification for excluding exposure-only victims from the Fund: victims who never manifest an injury would be overcompensated if they were compensated today; victims who manifest severe injuries might be undercompensated if they receive an estimated com- 41 In an effort to encourage potential claimants to opt into the Fund, he speculatively compared the experience of litigating a tort claim with the experience of filing a claim with the Fund: [ The alternative] is the idea of litigating . . . for seven or eight or nine years, hopefully getting a verdict, hopefully having it sustained on appeal, then paying your lawyer 40 percent of a fee, and then netting something at the end of the day while dragging through constantly remembering the horror of September 11, this is an alternative program, an alternative. 42 The Special Master was referring to the families of people killed on 9/11. Unlike exposure-only victims, these parties would not face the burden of proving causation in court. Among other hurdles, victims who manifest cancer in fifteen years caused by the toxins inhaled on September 11 will be required by a court to prove that their cancer must have been caused by the September 11 plume. Although expo- 37 Id. at 1862-63. 38 Id. at 1863-64. 39 Id. at 1864-65. Professor Rabin compares Simmons v. Pacor, Inc., 674 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1996) (holding, under the "two-disease rule" that claimants can sue for emotional distress and probabilistic recovery only for whatever disease they are suffering from at the time they sue) and Mauro v. Raymark Industries, 561 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1989) (holding that if a reasonable medical probability that the disease will develop can be established, present recovery for that disease will be permitted). 40 Rabin, supra note 9, at 1865. [Vol. 153: 1347 sure-only victims have a justiciable claim, the obstacles to prevailing on such a claim could very well be insurmountable.
Likelihood of Manifestation of Latent Injuries 43
It is possible that no serious injuries will ever manifest in those individuals exposed to the 9/11 plume. However, reflecting on the dicta of courts imploring the legislature to implement an extrajudicial solution to resolve the litigation problems arising from mass toxic torts, 44 it would still be wise to implement a solution now and hope there is never reason to use it. Although opponents will argue that this is a wasteful strategy, the scientific evidence indicates that there is a likelihood that this problem will arise.
The earliest evaluations of the air quality following the collapse of the WTC towers were on September 17, 2001-six days after the toxic plume covered lower Manhattan. 45 The delay leaves uncertain the accuracy of studies determining actual levels of toxicity in the plume and the effects of direct exposure to the plume. 46 Studies attempting 43 Needless to say, the scientific community has undertaken countless studies of the medical and environmental effects of the 9/11 plume. For lack of a better place to start, the reports and data discussed here are taken exclusively from the report of the New York Fire Department medical staff and studies conducted by the government agencies charged with monitoring the effects of 9/11 on human health. Bear in mind that subsequent analyses have charged the government with being overly optimistic to report on air quality immediately following the collapse of the buildings are markedly pessimistic as compared to government studies based on the quality of air one week after the event. 47 The validity of some of the government conclusions has been questioned, and even the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has admitted that it may have misled the public regarding the air quality at the WTC site. 48 The one thing on which all the studies agree is that it is not possible to rule out the possibility of long-term injury to the exposure-only victims of 9/11.
a. Harm to Firefighters
Dr. David Prezant, the Chief Medical Officer for the New York City Fire Department, studied the post-9/11 respiratory health of New York City firefighters. 49 Ninety percent of all firefighters complained of "severe respiratory-related cough and symptomatology" after exposure to the site. 50 Prezant noted "there was clinically significant respi- [Vol. 153: 1347 ratory exposure" among firefighters exposed to the plume but who were asymptomatic of "World Trade Center cough." 51 He concluded that "[w]hether symptoms and hyperreactivity in firefighters who worked at the World Trade Center site will prove persistent, resulting in reactive airways dysfunction syndrome or airway remodeling, requires long-term study." 52 In extrapolating his findings to the population of workers and residents of lower Manhattan, Prezant speculated about two alternatives: the negative health effects will be comparatively lower in the non-firefighter population because of the lower levels of exposure or the negative health effects will be comparatively higher because of the superior respiratory health of firefighters.
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Other studies favor the latter speculation, noting the presence of several high-risk groups (e.g., children, smokers) among the general population. was defined as a persistent cough that developed in a firefighter after exposure to the site and that was accompanied by respiratory symptoms severe enough to require medical leave for at least four weeks."). Eight percent of the firefighters present at the time the buildings collapsed developed WTC cough. Id. at 807 fig.1 Basing their analysis on these samples, taken two months after the toxic event, the study was unable to rule out long-term negative health consequences of continued exposure to the area. 58 Without giving any consideration to the impact of direct plume inhalation, the study considered lung cancer, 59 mesothelioma, 60 and silicosis 61 to be potential long-term hazards to individuals exposed to the site.
A study conducted by the CDC National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (CDC NIOSH) found that twenty to thirty percent of surveyed workers at a high school and college near the WTC site reported symptoms of eye irritation, nose/throat irritation, cough, and shortness of breath four to six months after the attacks.
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Reporting on the study, Dr. Bruce Bernard of the CDC NIOSH noted the striking "similarity between the prevalence of symptoms and the types of symptoms" 63 at the different sites surveyed. The study called for "further assessment to describe the nature and extent of illness in specific working groups as well as individual medical follow-up . . . to address workers' occupational health needs."
64 Even the most optimistic of these studies called for continued attention to the health of 55 [Vol. 153: 1347 those exposed to the WTC site. These studies recognized that there is a class of September 11 victims who have or will have medical needs and that not only have they not been positively addressed by Congress, but Congress has made it more difficult for these victims to receive the compensation to which they are entitled.
II. LIMITED LIABILITY RESULTS IN LIMITED RECOVERY
Section 408 of Title IV states: "[L]iability for all claims, whether for compensatory or punitive damages, arising from the terroristrelated aircraft crashes of September 11, 2001, against any air carrier shall not be in an amount greater than the limits of the liability coverage maintained by the air carrier."
65 This provision limits the amount available to all plaintiffs with claims arising out of September 11 to approximately six billion dollars, a figure dwarfed by estimates of eighty-five billion dollars in property damage alone.
66 Accordingly, it is unlikely that any of the six billion dollars will be available beyond the initial claims for property damage. 67 With this in mind, and in conjunction with the potential problem of exposure-only victims, it is reasonable to conclude that Congress has precluded individuals who will eventually manifest injuries caused by exposure to the 9/11 plume from ever recovering from the airlines. 67 One attorney commented that the six billion dollars would "probably be enough to handle" the claims of the thirty-eight passengers killed on United Airlines Flight 93, which crashed in Pennsylvania. Miller, supra note 66, at 7. Although the survivors of those thirty-eight passengers are eligible for the Fund, this statement provides an estimate of potential jury awards.
68 See Rabin, supra note 9, at 1858-59 (discussing the depletion of available insurance funds prior to the manifestation of injuries in exposure-only victims). gressional concern.
69 Here, there is no rational relationship between exposure-only victims and the airlines' limited liability. Making the exposure-only victims bear the burden of protecting the financial interests of the airlines is an unconstitutional extension of congressional power. Under Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, Inc., 70 there is an insufficient relationship between the exposure-only victims and the airlines' limited liability to justify the legislation under the Commerce Clause.
A. Authority to Limit Liability
In Duke Power, the Supreme Court held that the liability limitations of the Price-Anderson Act 71 did not render Price-Anderson an unconstitutional violation of due process or equal protection. 72 The PriceAnderson Act provides indemnification to private parties participating in the construction or operation of nuclear power facilities and limits their liability on the condition that they obtain the maximum private insurance available and waive most affirmative defenses.
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Should a nuclear disaster occur and a party's liability exceed the limitation, section 2210(e) provides that Congress will "take whatever action is de-69 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 83-84 (1978) . If the limiting clause is determined to be constitutional as an economic regulation, it raises the question of whether by precluding recovery for a valid cause of action, this clause constitutes a taking. The Ninth Circuit has held that " [t] here is no question that claims for compensation are property interests that cannot be taken for public use without compensation." In re Aircrash in Bali, Indon. on April 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1312 (9th Cir. 1982). A resolution of this question is immaterial to the argument presented here except to fortify the notion that if Congress does not provide a solution to this problem, the litigation necessary to determine liability and damages will be further compounded by takings litigation against the government. Extended and painful litigation for 9/11 victims is precisely what Congress should work to avoid. 70 [Vol. 153: 1347 termined to be necessary (including approval of appropriate compensation plans and appropriation of funds) to provide full and prompt compensation to the public for all public liability claims resulting from a disaster of such magnitude." 74 The Court put tremendous emphasis on this provision in its opinion. 75 The district court in Duke Power struck down the Price-Anderson Act on the grounds that "[t]he amount of recovery is not rationally related to the potential losses" and " [t] here is no quid pro quo" for the liability limitations. 76 The court also found an equal protection violation because the Act "placed the cost of [nuclear power] on an arbitrarily chosen segment of society, those injured by nuclear catastrophe." 77 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Price-Anderson provided for constitutional economic regulation.
78
The grounds for reversal in Duke Power do not exist in the case of 9/11 exposure-only victims.
Arbitrary and Irrational
There is a "presumption of constitutionality generally accorded economic regulations and [those regulations are] upheld absent proof of arbitrariness or irrationality on the part of Congress."
79 However, under the standards of arbitrariness and irrationality set forth in Duke Power, the liability limitation of Title IV of the ATSSSA is unconstitutional.
In Duke Power, the appellees challenged the amount at which liability was capped on the grounds that it was an arbitrary figure. 80 The Court upheld the limitation:
The reasonableness of the statute's assumed ceiling on liability was predicated on two corollary considerations-expert appraisals of the exceedingly small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of 74 78 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 83 (describing the limited liability provision as "a classic example of economic regulation" and thus presumed constitutional unless proven to be arbitrary or irrational). 79 Id. 80 Id. at 84.
$560 million, and the recognition that in the event of such an incident, Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief provisions to provide additional relief, in accord with prior practice.
81
Neither of these predicates exists for Title IV.
In the case of 9/11, the relevant event has already occurred. A potential event is not a concern, and the estimates of actual damage far exceed the six billion dollar limitation of liability.
82
The "additional relief" from Congress anticipated by the Court in Duke Power is in fact the legislation that limited the amount recoverable by victims. The Court in Duke Power pointed to the legislative history of the PriceAnderson Act, specifically a statement that "[t]he limitation of liability serves primarily as a device for facilitating further congressional review of such a situation, rather than as an ultimate bar to further relief of the public."
83 The Price-Anderson limitation created a starting point; the Title IV limitation is the end point. Title IV is intended to constitute the entirety of congressional assistance to the victims of 9/11, but in the case of exposure-only victims, it is an arbitrary and irrational bar to recovery.
Quid Pro Quo
The Court in Duke Power declined to resolve the question of whether quid pro quo is required for the abrogation of the commonlaw right of recovery because the Price-Anderson Act provides a sufficient substitute for the right. 84 The Court discussed at length the adequacy of the substituted right, 85 raising the question: if the Court was not inclined to require quid pro quo, why did it provide such a thorough analysis of the requirement? One might infer that despite the 81 Id. at 85. 82 See supra note 66 (noting one commentator's estimate that there are approximately one hundred billion dollars in potential Title IV claims).
83 Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 86 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 89-883, at 7 (1965)). 84 Id. at 87-88; see also Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 474 U.S. 892, 894-95 (1985) (denial of certiorari) (White, J., dissenting) ("Whether due process requires a legislatively enacted compensation scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common-law or state-law remedy it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be, thus appears to be an issue unresolved by this Court."). 85 See Duke Power Co., 438 U.S. at 87-93 (discussing the remedy mechanism under the Price-Anderson Act).
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Court's declining to affirmatively resolve the question, this lengthy analysis indicates the Court's valuation of the requirement.
86
Should the Court decide quid pro quo is mandated by the Due Process Clause, the ATSSSA offers no substitute to individuals with latent injuries for terminating their right to recover. The legislative history of the Price-Anderson Act relied on by the Court predicted exactly the situation created by Title IV:
It should be emphasized, moreover, that it is collecting a judgment, not filing a lawsuit, that counts. Even if defenses are waived under state law, a defendant with theoretically "unlimited" liability may be unable to pay a judgment once obtained. When the defendant's assets are exhausted by earlier judgments, subsequent claimants would be left with uncollectable awards. The prospect of inequitable distribution would produce a race to the courthouse door in contrast to the present system of assured orderly and equitable compensation.
87
In Duke Power, the Court found that the $560 million fund, supplemented by Congress' assurance that all additional damages would be compensated, was a "reasonable substitute" for the opportunity to recover damages through litigation.
88
The Court also endorsed an amended distribution scheme under the Price-Anderson Act that took into account the possibility of latent injuries. 89 The Court noted the value of an administrative fund in lieu of litigation for adjudicating the rights of individuals with latent injuries: "[t]he statutory scheme insures the equitable distribution of benefits to all who suffer injuryboth immediate and latent." 90 The Court further observed that "under the common-law route, the proverbial race to the courthouse would . . . determine who had 'first crack' at the diminishing re- The claim-administration procedures under the Act provide that in the event of an accident with potential liability exceeding the $560 million ceiling, no more than 15% of the limit can be distributed pending court approval of a plan of distribution taking into account the need to assure compensation for "possible latent injury claims which may not be discovered until a later time." Id. at 92. 90 Id.
sources of the tortfeasor, and fairness could well be sacrificed in the process." 91 Although one hesitates to ask that the tort system be fair, it does not seem too much to ask that a fundamental unfairness be eradicated.
Title IV caps the liability of parties liable for injuries stemming from 9/11 but provides no substitute to a potentially huge class of exposure-only plaintiffs. Adequate compensation to members of the manifested-injury class is not a sufficient justification to deprive members of the exposure-only class of their rights. 92 No matter how strong the justification of Congress in limiting the liability of the 9/11 parties, it does not satisfy even rational basis scrutiny with respect to the exposure-only plaintiffs. The limitation clause expressly violates the stated purpose of Title IV. 93 While economic legislation is permissible under rational scrutiny, the courts cannot accept that a narrow group of people-here the exposure-only victims-bears the burden of economically sustaining the airlines. If Congress wishes to provide economic support to the airlines, as it clearly does, it should do so by providing compensation to all victims who could sue the airlines, not just to those with the easiest cases.
III. A PROPOSAL
This Comment proposes a fund designed to track and compensate those exposure-only victims of September 11 who manifest disease connected to their exposure to the 9/11 plume. Called the Latent Injury Fund, this fund should be loosely based on the existing Victim Compensation Fund and can rely on the existing World Trade Center Health Registry to identify applicants.
A. The Registry
The fundamental mechanism necessary to track those individuals potentially suffering latent injuries from exposure to the 9/11 plume is already in place. On September 5, 2003, the NYCDHMH, ATSDR, and the CDC National Center for Environmental Health (CDC NCEH) announced the formation of the World Trade Center Health 91 
Id.
92 See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (recognizing "the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs"). 93 See supra text accompanying note 3 (citing the Act's legislative intent to compensate any individual injured on September 11).
[Vol. 153: 1347 Registry (the "Registry"). 94 The Registry is a "comprehensive and confidential health survey of those most directly exposed to the events of 9/11" designed to track the physical and mental health of those surveyed. 95 The Registry tracks:
• People who were in a building, on the street, or on the subway south of Chambers Street on 9/11/01. • People involved in rescue, recovery, or clean up, or other activities at the WTC site and/or WTC Recovery Operations on Staten Island any time between 9/11/01 and 6/30/02.
• Students and staff in schools (pre-K through 12) or day care centers south of Canal Street on 9/11/01.
• People who were living south of Canal Street on 9/11/01.
96
In establishing its purpose, the Registry's materials note that "[t]he full impact of this unprecedented event on health may not be known for years. We do not know if there are any long-term health effects among those who lived or worked near the WTC site on 9/11." 97 In turn, the Registry's purpose is to "understand the possible health consequences related to 9/11." 96 Id. 97 Id. In a direct appeal to the target population, the Registry expresses the same sentiment:
Even if you have been healthy since 9/11, it is important for you to sign up. In order to have a full and accurate picture of any long-term health effects related to 9/11, both people who have been healthy and people who have been ill are strongly encouraged to enroll in the WTC Health Registry. HOW TO ENROLL, supra note 95, at 2. 98 Id. at 1.
Registry organizers believe that registration of even 20,000 of the 300,000 eligible participants would provide a sufficient base to conduct valuable research. 99 As of September 30, 2003, only twenty-five days after opening registration, 12,902 people had already preenrolled in the Registry and the Registry had obtained contact information for 27,140 additional targeted individuals. 100 As of September 10, 2004, 61,087 people had been registered and interviewed by the Registry. 101 The Registry was advertised extensively in the New York City subway system and PATH 102 Cir. 1987 ) (noting that the settlement "gives the class more than it would likely achieve by attempting to litigate to the death"). The district court also commented on its inability to heal all the plaintiffs' pain:
The court has been deeply moved by its contact with members of the plaintiffs' class from all over the nation and abroad. Many do deserve better of their country. Had this court the power to rectify past wrongs-actual or per-pense caused by protracted litigation. 112 The Special Master said: "[Title IV] is written in such a way that if [claimants] decide to litigate, the likelihood of success, the likelihood of receiving a substantial award in court, is substantially diminished." 113 Although the Special Master justified the limited nature of the Fund by characterizing the Fund's true purpose as a cathartic act necessary to the recovery of the Nation, not the victims, 114 this characterization is incongruous with the stated purpose of the Fund. 115 Additionally, it was the Special Master who acted as the town crier with respect to the horrors of the justice system that awaited potential litigants. With this background in mind, it seems irresponsible to force those who eventually manifest diseases caused by WTC exposure to resort to litigation with little hope of recovering compensation for their injuries. 116 Once the original Fund has soothed the pain of the Nation, are we to leave all other victims to suffer in silence? [Vol. 153: 1347 In structuring a fund for latent injuries, the obvious models are the existing Victim Compensation Fund and the Agent Orange Settlement Fund.
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Also designed by Special Master Feinberg, 118 the Agent Orange Settlement Fund is an appropriate model of an administrative compensation scheme for latent injuries. Drawing from the Agent Orange Settlement Fund and the Victim Compensation Fund, one might loosely sketch a fund that will meet the changing needs of the exposure-only victims of 9/11. 1. Financing, Administration, and Claims Processing
Like the Victim Compensation Fund, the Latent Injury Fund should be funded without limitation by Congress, 119 and it should not have a scheduled termination date. Because the Agent Orange Fund was a finite program, individuals manifesting injuries after the fund closed were precluded from recovering from the fund and filed suit against the original tortfeasors. 120 That litigation continues to be unresolved. 121 The Latent Injury Fund must be inclusive of all who are eligible and must be structured to maximize its accessibility to eligible individuals.
Other than the medical research conducted independent of the fund, the administration of the Latent Injury Fund should be consolidated within the Department of Justice. Like the Victim Compensation Fund, the decisions of the Latent Injury Fund should not be subject to judicial oversight and parties should be required to relinquish their rights to litigate prior to opting into the fund. Without this quid pro quo, Congress has no incentive to implement a new fund. 
Eligibility a. Pre-Registration for the Latent Injury Fund
The question of eligibility is the most difficult one because of the opportunity for fraud. However, the risk of fraud is an inadequate reason to not create an assistance program. Additionally, fraudulent applications to the Victim Compensation Fund were negligible. 122 The sooner the Latent Injury Fund is implemented, the sooner work can begin to identify fraudulent cases. Registration for the WTC Health Registry should be the first step in claiming eligibility. This has two purposes: first, maximizing registration will expand the ability of the medical community to collect information about the effects of exposure to the 9/11 plume; second, registration has no immediate benefit. Although there will undoubtedly be forward-looking fraud, no benefits accrue at the time of registration and therefore there is less incentive to register fraudulently. The Latent Injury Fund should rely on the same fraud prevention guidelines as the Victim Compensation Fund. 123 To avoid the Amchem problems of notice and concerns about imposing a requirement of action on the part of otherwise healthy, exposure-only injuries, 124 individuals should be permitted to opt into the Latent Injury Fund despite not pre-registering. However, there should be an increased level of scrutiny for proof of exposure for those that did not pre-register for the fund via the Registry.
b. Eligibility for Compensation from the Latent Injury Fund
To borrow from the eligibility requirements for the Agent Orange Fund, to be eligible for the Latent Injury Fund, one should be required to meet the following requirements: (1) the claimant was exposed to toxins on or near the WTC site on 9/11, 125 (2) the claimant ease of a uniform award may trump all other considerations, it is important to remember that granting a uniform award does not track the civil justice system, which is an important aspect of the Fund. Although a catastrophe of this magnitude heavily burdens our litigation system, the parallels between the Fund and a civil suit recognize the benefits of the justice system. As noted in the Final Report, a flat award may not be sufficient consideration to force applicants to relinquish those benefits.
CONCLUSION
The American judicial system is ill-equipped to resolve mass toxic torts. And the toxic plume released by the collapse of the World Trade Center created a situation as unmanageable as any casebook mass tort, but with a twist. The government simultaneously excluded the potential 300,000 exposure-only victims from the Victim Compensation Fund and precluded those same victims from ever recovering through the tort system.
The limited liability provision of the ATSSSA is unconstitutional. Congress cannot protect the airline industry at the expense of the industry's victims. If Congress wishes to maintain the liability cap in Title IV, it must provide an alternative compensation scheme to those injured on 9/11. Whether the compensation scheme bears any resemblance to that set out here is of no consequence. We must protect these victims at any cost.
